Credit where credit belongs

Primarily the log came from www.2ndbattalion94thartillery.com site.
Only the log information pertinent to "A Battery" was collected.




Battalion Commander

17 June 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Alan A. Bristor
30 Nov 1968, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Courant
14 July 1969, Lieutenant Colonel William H. Krueger
13 Jan 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Hale
3 Feb 1970, Major Ferguson
1 March 1970, Major James Laslie, Jr.


A Battery Commander

Captain William Langer


A Battery First Sergeant






During this time period the 2/94th took part in Summer-Fall 1969

During the summer and fall of 1969, conduct of operations was increasingly turned over to the Vietnamese; US troops withdrew in greater numbers amid reaffirmations of support for the Republic of South Vietnam government. President Nixon announced the reduction of the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam, which would be demonstrated initially by the withdrawal of 25,000 troops by 31 August 1969.
 
American troop strength had peaked at 543,400 in April 1969 but dropped to 505,500 by mid-October. More scattered than before, enemy attacks were concentrated on South Vietnamese positions. U.S. combat deaths were down in the early fall as American units switched to small unit actions. The trend was not constant however, because U.S. troops deaths, which had fallen well below l00 a week in the fall, rose above 100 later in the year. (End of description)
 
During the summer and fall of 1969, the Battalion position received rocket and mortar rounds once or twice a week.  Only a few rounds were received each time, and damage was negative or minor, with no casualties.
 
In July, the Battery re-sandbagged all bunkers and gun berms in the area due to deterioration from the elements.  The perimeter guard bunkers were also completely re-constructed to give more effective coverage as well as protection.  A Satisfactory rating was received on the AGI in late July.  The Corps Firing Battery Inspection soon followed and was successfully passed in early August.  The Battery re-surfaced all the gun pads in preparation for this monsoon season.  The Corps CMMI Team inspected in early Sep and a satisfactory rating was obtained.  The perimeter was re-enforced with more emphasis placed on channalizing any hostile personnel.
Signed by Commanding, Capt, FA Gordon F. Kelley





On 17 June 1969, A Battery participated in a TOT on a suspected enemy battalion with 50 enemies KIA.

On 22 June 1969 at 0400 hours, LZ Nancy received four rounds of incoming – no damage or injuries in Battery area.

On 23 June 1969 at 0015 hours, A Battery received incoming – no rounds landed in Battery area.

On 8 July 1969, A Battery participated in a TOT on a suspected enemy battalion with 60 enemies KIA.
 
On July 8 1969 at 0900 hours, A Battery began their move from Camp Evans to LZ Sally. At 0945 hours, A Battery closed at LZ Sally. At 0958 hours, A Battery laid safe and ready to fire.
 

Notes and discussion from 1 May 1969 to 31 July 1969, 11th Battalion Operational Report
Mission assignment:  General support to XXIV Corps, reinforcing fire of the 12th Marine Regiment (Batteries B and C); Reinforcing 101st Division Artillery with an 8-inch battery (Battery A); and a quick fire channel to the 101st Division Artillery (Battery C).
During the reporting period the Battalion fired 8,903 missions with 25,218 8-inch projectiles expended.

On 31 October 1969, Gun #4 of A Battery fired the battalion’s 300,000th round in support of the free world forces in Vietnam.  Present for the ceremony were Lieutenant General  Melvin Zais, Commanding General XXIV Corps, Brigadier General  Allan G. Pixton, Commanding General XXIV Corps Artillery; Colonel R.C. Cartwright, Commanding Officer 108th Artillery Group; and Colonel Moore, Commanding Officer 101st Division Artillery.

300,000 Round Ceremony300,000th Round Gun 4, Angry





Notes and discussion from 1 August 1969 to 31 October 1969, 12th Battalion Operational Report
 
Mission assignment:  General support to XXIV Corps, reinforcing fire of the 12th Marine Regiment (Batteries B and C); Reinforcing 101st Division Artillery with an 8-inch battery (Battery A); and a quick fire channel to the 101st Division Artillery (Battery C).
 
During the reporting period the Battalion fired 5,768 missions expending 27,655 8-inch rounds.
 
During the period there was a significant increase in the number of missions fired for the 1st ARVN Regiment, 1st ARVN Division.
 
The Battalion experienced no significant personnel shortages during the period.
 
During the periods of rain or high moisture content frequent premature detonations of the 8-inch round have occurred using PD M557 fuze with both charge 5&7 White Bag. Recommend that the fuze PD M557 be constructed to withstand firing in heavy rainfall.  An equipment improvement report was submitted on 1 November 1969.
 
With the Battalion dispersed over an 81-km front the concept of centralized maintenance operations is impractical.  Recommend the formation of Maintenance Readiness Teams capable of moving to battery locations.
 
End of notes and discussion, 12th Battalion Operational Report



During this time period the 2/94th took part in Winter-Spring
(11-01-69 to 04-30-70)

An increase in enemy-initiated attacks, at the highest level since 4-5 September, signaled the start of the first phase of the Communist winter campaign. This was highlighted by intensified harassment incidents, and attacks throughout the Republic of Vietnam. In November-December these were heaviest in Corps Tactical Zones III and IV (around Saigon), primarily directed against Vietnamese military installations in order to disrupt the pacification program. The most significant enemy activity occurred in November with heavy attacks upon By Prang and Duc Lap in CTZ II (Central Vietnam).
 
By February 1970, the focus of enemy activity began to shift to CTZ I and II. Attacks increased steadily, reaching a peak in April 1970. Hostile forces staged their heaviest attacks in the Central Highlands near Civilian Irregular Defense Group camps at Dak Seang, Dak Pek, and Ben Het in I CTZ. The enemy also conducted numerous attacks by fire and several sapper attacks against U.S. fire support bases. This high level of enemy activity began in I CTZ in April and continued through May.
 
During the period 1 November 1969 through 30 April 1970, U.S. and allied forces concentrated on aggressive operations to find and destroy enemy main and local forces, the penetration of base camps and installations and, the seizure of enemy supplies and materiel. These operations sought to deny the enemy the initiative and to inflict heavy losses in men and materiel. Further progress was made in Vietnamization through improving the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. As a result of these advances, three brigades of the 1st U.S. Infantry Division and several major USMC units were withdrawn from Vietnam during this period.
 
The enemy made several efforts to take the offensive at Dak Seang, which was attacked on 1 April 1970 and remained under siege throughout the month, and at Quang Duc in the By Prong-Duc Lap area, which ended on 28 December. Only Vietnamese forces were engaged in both of these operations, the Quang Duc campaign involving some 12,000 ARVN troops. South Vietnamese forces again took the offensive on 14 April in a bold 3-day operation in the Angel's Wing area along the Cambodian border. The Vietnamese Army completed this mission in an aggressive professional manner without US support—further evidence of their growing proficiency. (End of Description)

On 21 December 1969 on or about 0030 hours, Camp Evans went on Red Alert as 50 enemy soldiers were spotted outside the wire.  ARA was employed, results Negative.

On 21 January 1970 at 0715 hours, A Battery displaced 3 guns from LZ Sally, coordinates YD39473835, west of LZ Nancy for an artillery raid.  At 1220 hours, A Battery closed.
Note by chronicler: Assumed to be FSB Negg. See below. (End of note)

On 25 January 1970 at 0950 hours, A Battery departs FSB Negg.  At 1100 hours, A Battery closed FSB Sharon.  Assume the mission of reinforcing the fires of the 1st Brigade 5th Mech.

Notes and discussion from 1 November 1969 to 31 January 1970, 13th Battalion Operational Report
 
Mission assignment:  General support to XXIV Corps, Reinforcing 101st Division Artillery  (Batteries A and B); and a quick fire channel to the 101st Division Artillery (Battery C).  Battery C also reinforced the fire of 5/4 with the 5th Mech.

On 12 February at 1355 hours, A Battery departed LZ Anne for an artillery raid. The raid consisted of two M107's each from A and C Battery.  Command and control was provided by A Battery.  Resupply was by air only.

On 16 February at 1355 hours, A Battery departed LZ Anne.  At 1505 hours, Gun B3, M107, hit land mine at Grid YD326425 and declared combat loss.   Track, road wheel, and spade cylinders blown off.  One man medevac'd to 18th Surgical, injuries slight.  At 1645 hours, an M42A1 Duster, pulling ammo trailer, detonated mine vicinity Grid YD326445.  Two men WIA. Note by chronicler: These two men must have been with the Duster, as the battalion only reports one WIA and one one 1/2 ton trailer destroyed. (End of note)  At 1715 hours, mine sweep team found a mine, type unknown, destroyed in place.  At 1725 hours, Battalion CO request ARA along route of March for A Battery.  At 2115 hours, the last vehicle closed LZ Sharon.

On 30 March 1970 at 0900 hours, A Battery (composite unit) departed FSB Sharon for FSB Barbara.  At 1032 hours, A Battery arrived LZ Nancy.   At 1123 hours, A Battery departed LZ Nancy.  At 1730 hours, A Battery closed FSB Barbara, A Battery to replace B Battery 1st Bn 39th Artillery.
 
FSB Barbara was falling apart due to the two weeks of steady rain.  Bunkers were sliding off the hill and caving in and the constant vibration from the firings was collapsing bunkers.  The road to Barbara was not secure and full of mines.  One M110, a bulldozer, and one 5-ton truck have been lost,  along with 3 WIA's, attempting to pass the road.
 
On 31 March 1970, the Battalion Met Section moved from Camp Evans to Dong Ha to support the firing batteries moving north.

On 3 April 1970 at 1155 hours, report of a vehicle in supply convoy to FSB Barbara carrying ammo; hit mine.  Called in by Thunder Chief.  Two men evacuated, not serious.  CP #5, Grid 380379 – doesn’t say if it was one of ours in the convoy or who it may have been.  At 1330 hours, the convoy closed FSB Barbara.  At 1615, convoy departed FSB Barbara.  At? hours convoy closed at Nancy.  All vehicles accounted for at 1945 hours.
On 8 April 1970 at 0800 hours, FSB Barbara; visibility was 25 meters the ceiling was zero!
On 10 April 1970 at 1100 hours, M88 returning from FSB Barbara, at Grid 380 and 379 hit unknown size and type mine.  One road wheel and track blown off.  No injuries.

On 18 April 1970, a visual Met Station was established at FSB Barbara to provide met data to the firing batteries at FSB Barbra and FSB Anne.  Three personnel are assigned this function.
 
On 20 April 1970 at 1115 hours, convoy departed LZ Nancy.  Convoy went in to Barbara, left there between 1600 to 1635 hours.  They closed at LZ Nancy at 1830 hours.   At 2010 hours, message from A Battery, gun slid off into ditch.  Two dozers could not pull it out.  A Battery CO setting up NDP at that position now.  Note by chronicler: Night Defensive Position. (End of note)

On 21 April 1970 at 1840 hours, M110 will be pulled back to Barbara by bulldozer.
 
On 24 April 1970 at 1105 hours, M88 hit mine vicinity CP 7, no injuries, blew track and road wheel, left side.
 

On 29 April 1970 at 0130 hours, the breechblock of a 175mm gun in A Battery blew off the back during a fire mission at FSB Barbara, killing two and wounding three others.  The wounded were evacuated.  The battery fought for six hours to put out the flames and move powder and projectiles, which were in close proximity of the burning gun.  Those A Battery members killed were SP4 Willie Austin Jr. from Mount Vernon, Alabama and Sergeant Paul Kosanke from Eldora, Indiana. Powder lot was suspended.
 
US Army #12A57868, Tube #6283, Breech 4522, Inspection #8767855.  Powder lot #BAJ66383-68.  Projectile lot #?
 
Account from Specialist David Radle of A Battery regarding the gun incident above:  The gun was not working properly and everyone knew it. The men were told to use it ONLY in an emergency.
 
However, someone thought there was enemy around and so they were told to shoot the fire mission using that gun, knowing it wasn't working properly.  Willie Austin told me to go to the bunker, as I was "short", so Willie took my position of firing the gun.  The breechblock blew killing the two men.  Injured were Gloudeman; who killed himself two years ago, and a man named "Bill" was blinded; cannot remember his last name.  They were good soldiers and I miss them both.
 
I have had difficult moments over the years because of Willie having taken my place on the gun and then having it backfire on him.
 
I tried so hard to get someone in the government to understand what had happened--that it never should have been fired.  However they denied anything was ever wrong with the gun. They denied a lot though and this is only one incident.
 
May they both Rest in Peace. (End of account)

Notes and discussion from 1 February 1970 to 30 April 1970, 14th Battalion Operational Report
 
Mission assignment remained the same as last operational report:
Mission assignment:  General support to XXIV Corps, Reinforcing 101st Division Artillery  (Batteries A and B); and a quick fire channel to the 101st Division Artillery (Battery C).  Battery C also reinforced the fire of 5/4 with the 5th Mech.
 
Rounds expended: 8-inch 19,033   175mm 11,956
 
KIA none
WIA 6 (Unknown at this time)
Non-battle Injury 17 (Unknown at this time)
Non-battle Death 2 -  Those A Battery members killed, when the breechblock failed, were Specialist Willie Austin Jr. from Mount Vernon, Alabama and Sergeant Paul Kosanke from Eldora, Indiana.
 
There is a requirement that each Autofrettaged 175mm tube be evaluated at 700 and 100 EFC rounds during its life.  In some conditions the personnel and equipment are not readily available for this task and the gun cannot be fired.  It is therefore recommended that Battalion Maintenance personnel be authorized for this task.
 
End of notes and discussion, 14th Battalion Operational Report
 

Next Campaign is 10th Campaign, Sanctuary Counteroffensive